Management and Development Process

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This study tries to examine the effect of monitoring mechanism of Corporate Governance to decreasing the Earning Management Intensity. Intensity of earning management behavior is described on the basis of the 'threshold model' through bringing up the reported earnings to thresholds. It consists beating the benchmark (thresholds) and not doing so. Our empirical tests are conducted by regression analysis using data 185 listed firms with fiscal years 1382-1388, and pooling time series and cross-section data. The results of empirical tests indicate that with α=0.01 there is income-increasing earning management behavior both each thresholds. Examining the role of monitoring device of corporate governance in intensity of EM behavior that is tested by logistic regression and U Mann Whitney indicates that monitoring device don’t restrict it. Only when pre-managed earning are below last period’s reported earning outside directors and institutional investors influence the likelihood that reported earnings exceed the thresholds

Keywords: Conservative Earning Management, Aggressive Earning Management, Thresholds, Corporate Governance, Outside Directors, Institutional Investors

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